The main findings are that the internet accounts for

That last one is particularly slippery. Consumer surplus has a very specific economic definition, but there are certainly benefits (and costs) to internet use that are difficult to measure. For one provocative take on this, check out this economic paper on the correlation between increased internet access and rape.

(via Marginal Revolution)

Excerpt:

In the 1880s, a fascinating chain of letters appeared in the magazine Science and in other publications, including the New York Times. The scientific community was being victimized by a clever confidence man, who was working his way into members’ trust and then stealing from them. The exploits span at least 7 years and stretch over much of the United States. Most surprising about it, however, is that the con artist was so successful because he was apparently trained as one of their own.

The swindled scientists actually end up admiring the conman, as he is obviously a talented paleontologist. Here’s a quote from one of the last letters about the man:

Don’t know where he went, but he certainly is very gifted and smart, and is well posted in paleontology, and would make the best I have ever known provided he stuck to it and honesty.

Impressive history writing from a consistently good blog.

I asked him, “If paradigms are really incommensurable, how is history of science possible? Wouldn’t we be merely interpreting the past in the light of the present? Wouldn’t the past be inaccessible to us? Wouldn’t it be ‘incommensurable?’”

He started moaning. He put his head in his hands and was muttering, “He’s trying to kill me. He’s trying to kill me.”

And then I added, “…except for someone who imagines himself to be God.”

It was at this point that Kuhn threw the ashtray at me.

Not only is the whole thing funny, it also seems to be developing into an interesting critique of Kuhn, a thinker I never found as convincing as many others seem to do.

It’s also interesting that Morris attended Saul Kripke’s lectures that would later turn into Naming and Necessity, the only philosophy book I have read more than two times, and one of the very best. I’m usually not into analytical philosophy, but this is so much more, and the fact that the book is compiled from the notes of a student listening to the lecture, which Kripke gave without notes, is simply astounding. It is a tough but mercifully short read, which is why I’ve reread it several times, but recommended to anyone who believe that the study of language has nothing to do with real life.

The presentation requires Silverlight, so it comes with the usual Microsoft warning for my part. But actually, I think the dual view of slides and presentation is quite neat:

You can download the slides here.

2. Are you saying we saying we should become like economists? Dear Lord, no. As a group, economists have committed the scientific method fallacy. They assume that one really good tool for science accounts for all of science. They have essentially abolished field studies, history, ethnography, and other important tools. Sociology should not engage in petty debates that end up dumping our best work. Instead, we should create a social science that strives to combine important different types of research.

From OrgTheory.

What happens to this new, fluffy global zeitgeist when it runs up against the old-style hierarchical dictatorship in a death match, where the latter has about 300 Abrams tanks? We may be about to find out.

One other interesting idea is that the demographics in these autocracies are now beginning to look like those of the “Western” world fifty years ago: larger middle class, better-educated youth. One should be careful in drawing historical analogies too far, but it is interesting to consider. Also, remember that here the middle-class and the well-educated are facing a much worse situation than the baby boomers, with a large percentage not really having a secure future.

When I say fairly, though, it comes with certain caveats. There are as I see it some problematic assumptions in this piece that together point to troubling political conclusions. Mostly, they deal with how Colgan defines the different variables, but even if we’re willing to overlook the methodological issues I think he overstresses his point. This is summarized in the following table:

Here, MID stands for “militarized interstate disputes”, which can range from full-out war via border disputes to diplomatic tussles. “Agg-MID” means that the petro-state is aggressively causing disputes, while “Def-MID” means that the petro-state is being aggressed against. Colgan’s point is that petro-states are much more aggressive than “regular” states, which seems to be true from this table, but he fails to mention that they are almost equally being aggressed against. This would suggest that there is something in the resource itself. However, when he later summarizes the different variables, it turns out that the “petro” part is not as important as the “revolutionary” part in explaining aggression. Which is in itself a nice finding.

However, there are as mentioned some problematic assumptions here. What are they? Let’s have a look, first, at the variables. To construct his measure of aggression, Colgan has no measure of the seriousness of different types of aggression. The U.S. invasion of Iraq is counted as one dispute, as is Iran’s attempt to gain nuclear capability (which has so far only prompted aggression from nations already in possession of nuclear arms). Clearly, the first of these examples has proven to be far more devastating than the second, although one cannot rule out that Iran might one day nuke for example Israel. Still, Colgan’s data set is large, and even a cursory glance at recent world history sees oil exporting countries involved in quite a lot of armed conflict or other diplomatic disputes.

More problematic is his use of control variables. Most are fine, like looking at disputed borders and such. But for some reason, using Samuel Huntington’s controversial theories of a “clash of civilizations” as basis, he has decided to include the proportion of Muslims in a country as a possibly positive correlator with aggression, claiming bluntly that “they have cultural and demographic features that make them violenceprone”. I have a really hard time understanding why this would be included, and this sort of baseless stereotyping should have been weeded out before this was published. To me, this weakens the whole article, which is a shame considering that there is an interesting discussion about the value of political stability and democratic accountability to be had here.

There is also a clear political point to be read from this. Colgan fails to make the case for what is considered aggression and not. For example, Iran’s support of Hamas is considered an example of aggression, but U.S. support for the other side of that conflict is not. Similarly, he considers Venezuela’s withdrawal of diplomats from Colombia in 2008 an act of aggression, but fails to mention that it was caused by Colombian soldiers entering neighbouring countries to attack guerilla groups. (On a side note, I never seize to be amazed that anyone can consider the Colombian government more legit than its neighbours. One would think half a century of continued armed conflict with presently no less than 15 different groups engaged in operations signifies a regime that is consistently failing to attend to the grievances of a large portion of the population. But no, guns in the hands of the army (and, of course, their partners in drug dealing and paramilitary activities) are by definition Good, while guns in the hands of peasant revolutionaries (and, of course, their partners in drug dealing and kidnapping) are by definition Bad.)

All problems aside, the main worry of Colgan is still sound: In the future, ever more of the world’s much-needed energy will come from regimes that no sane person would want to have more power. That is worrying. Therefore, the only conclusion is to promote alternative sources of energy, which is the conclusion Colgan arrives at too.

Colgan, J. (2010). Oil and Revolutionary Governments: Fuel for International Conflict International Organization, 64 (04), 661-694 DOI: 10.1017/S002081831000024X

Colgan, J. (2011). Oil and resource-backed aggression Energy Policy DOI: 10.1016/j.enpol.2010.12.042

In the letter, the mathematicians complain about the rising prices, saying:

We mathematicians produce the papers, serve as editors, and serve as referees, all for free (except of course for our support by our universities and employers). Then with relatively small improvement to the product, publishers turn around and sell it to our libraries at (in many cases) a very high price.

and

Ignorance is not the only issue; we do not bear the costs of our decisions to support high priced journals. Our libraries do, and they have been curiously quiet about twisting our arms to be thrifty. After all, it has been estimated that in 1991 American libraries spent about the same amount on math journals, $70 million, as the NSF budget for mathematics. Furthermore, we are human and like to see the fruits of our labor printed on high quality paper with elegant typesetting; it validates our hard work.

One thing is why this is continuing (researchers not bearing the cost, wanting the prestige), but what’s causing this price hike in the first place? To me, the only sensible explanation is that institutions and publishers are using journals as cash cows. Since libraries are more or less bound to keep subscribing to popular journals, prices can rise to a point just below where keeping the journal is more painful than letting it go. Which obviously is not yet. One of the most interesting findings from the larger study referenced over is that three publishers stand for about half of all journal revenue: Elsevier, Springer and Wiley, from here referred to as Big Science. No other single actor has more than a 3 % market share. Big Science operate with significantly higher profit margins than smaller periodical publishers (36 % versus 4 %, a nine-fold increase) and is even condemned for this by business analysts:

In justifying the margins earned, the publishers, REL [Elsevier] included, point to the highly skilled nature of the staff they employ (to pre-vet submitted papers prior to the peer review process), the support they provide to the peer review panels, including modest stipends, the complex typesetting, printing and distribution activities, including Web publishing and hosting. REL employs around 7,000 people in its Science business as a whole. REL also argues that the high margins reflect economies of scale and the very high levels of efficiency with which they operate. We believe the publisher adds relatively little value to the publishing process. We are not attempting to dismiss what 7,000 people at REL do for a living. We are simply observing that if the process really were as complex, costly and value-added as the publishers protest that it is, 40% margins wouldn’t be available.

This further strengthens the argument that these function as pure cash cows for commercial publishers.

Of course, all this only covers the cost of subscribing to journals. In addition to this comes the cost of relegating ever more resources to editing and peer reviewing journals (not to mention writing the articles in the first place), which is covered by the academic institutions. The fact that publishers are getting most of the work done for them for free makes the price levels even more baffling.

[1] As to why mathematical journals have had a higher price increase, this could have to do with the fact that natural science publications are far more expensive than social science/humanities publications, so the willingness to pay a lot was already present when the price hiking began.